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SELF-DETERMINATION 
& AMERICAN RHETORIC 
BY DOT TlJER 
IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF FEBRUARY 26, 1990
when 30 per cent of the counted votes indicated a irm lead for the National 
Opposition Union (UNO), a ragile coalition of 12 parties ranging rom the 
extreme right to the rigid left, no celebrations erupted, no iestas or shouts of 
jubilation broke the eerie silence. It was as if overnight Managua (the capital , ,. 
wo blooks away in a=:�;�:�  d��
to the memory of assassinated Swedish Prime Minister 
Olaf Palme, Daniel Ortega was delivering his concession 
speech to a room full of bleary-eyed journalists and 
tearful campaign workers. In his televised speech to the 
nation, Ortega announced that independent of the 
election outcome, the Sandinistas stood proud and 
victorious before the people of the world: proud to have 
contributed a little dignity, social justice and democracy 
to an unjust world divided between the weak and the 
strong; victorious in the fulfilment of an electoral 
process that had being internationally recognized as 
"ree and fair." 
Ortega's words were resonant with history, words 
cognizant of the realities that have confronted the Nica­
raguan people since the FSLN (Sandinista National 
Liberation Front) vindicated the memory of Sandino on 
July 19, 1979 by overthrowing the U.S.-backed Somoza 
dictatorship and becoming a symbol or national libera­
tion and anti-imperialist struggles. For in the context of 
the United States' determination to discredit the Nica­
raguan elections as fraudulent and undemocratic, a plu­
ralist facade that masked a sinister totalitarianism, the 
Sandinistas won an important international victory on 
February 25, 1990. However, in the context of the U.S.'s 
determination to destroy the Sandinista revolution as 
an example of resistance from the periphery that could 
challenge the hegemony of the centre, the victory 
proved bittersweet. 
The Central American crisis constitutes an immense and acute 
preoccupation or the United States of America because Central 
America is our neighbour and a strategic crossing of worldwide 
significance; since Cuba and the Soviet Union invest massive 
eforts to extend their influence and thereore carry out in the 
hemisphere plans which are particularly hostile to the interests 
of the United States; and because the people of Central America 
are troubled and in urgent need of our help. 
-Henry Kissinger, Central American Bipartite Commission, 1984.1
Some observers consider the liberalizing trends in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe proof that the Cold War is over and 
that the West has won. But they ignore the second major 
contradiction: that between the centre and the periphery. 
-Jeanne Kilpatrick, Baltimore Sun, September 26, 1989. 
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The United States of America's aggression against Nica­
ragua, through low intensity warfare, covert and overt 
political intervention, and economic blockades and des­
tabilization, has been an object of international con­
demnation since the Reagan Administration began 
funding and training counter-revolutionary ("Contra") 
forces in 1981. The duplicity of politicians and the com­
plicity of the mainstream press in their tacit support of 
American interventionist policies abroad and of disin­
formation campaigns at home was analyzed by Noam 
Chomsky in Turning the Tide and The Culture of Terror­
ism. 2 Other investigations, such as Holly Scklar's 
Washington's War on Nicaragua, detailed the strategies 
and goals that lay beneath the whitewashed surface of 
the Administration's official interest in "helping" the 
people of Nicaragua. 
Yet, it was only when the Iran-Contra scandal broke 
in 1986, with prime-time revelations of arms deals and 
unconstitutional activities, that the majority of Ameri­
cans started to pay attention to the events unolding in 
their "backyard" south of the border. A groundswell of 
outrage against a dirty war waged on their behalf, 
however, never materialized. While the means to an end 
were clearly repugnant to most Americans, the ideologi­
cal assumptions that underpinned the Administration's 
goal of ending a revolutionary "nightmare" in Nicara­
gua and reinstating the hegemony of the American 
Dream were never fundamentally in question. 
The impact of the Iran-Contra scandal on domestic 
politics was minimized by a slick public relations cam­
paign which succeeded in diverting public attention 
away from the implications of a parallel base of power 
outside of Congress jurisdiction. 
From the centre, the periphery remained just that: 
peripheral to the lived realities and mediated under­
standings of most Americans. The tensions created by 
200 years of American intervention in the region never 
surfaced in reference to Nicaragua.3 
Massive poverty and spiraling inflation, puppet re­
gimes and widespread repression, growing militariza­
tion, crippling external debt payments and Interna­
tional Monetary Fund (IMF)-sponsored austerity pro­
grams remained issues inherent to Latin America rather 
than legacies of imperialism. 
The United States' determination to destroy the 
Sandinista revolution as a dangerous example of resis­
tance to a vicious cycle of neocolonialism and underde­
velopment was never named as such. The roots of the 
North/South conflict that had given birth to the 
Sandinista model of political pluralism and a mixed 
economy were instead masked by a West/East axis 
ideology, enshrouded in a Cold War rhetoric of democ­
racy versus totalitarianism. Thus, while the ocus of 
Washington's aggression against Nicaragua would offi­
cially slift from a military to a political front during the 
Nicaraguan electoral process, the false symmetry of 
equating anti-imperialist and Third World struggles 
with the spectre of "communist cancers" remained 
intact. 
I 
By 1987, the options or achieving a military victory 
over the Sandinista government, short of a direct inva­
sion by the United States, had virtually been ex­
hausted.4 The combined resistance of the civilian popu­
lation and the Sandinista Popular Army in Nicaragua 
had contained the majority of the Contra forces to their 
bases in Honduras. The heavy fighting rom 1984 to 
1986 had been reduced to border squirmishes and Contra 
attacks on "soft" (i.e., civilian) targets. The majority of 
the indigenous rebels, the Miskito Indians of the Atlan­
tic Coast, had broken with the Contra leadership to 
return to Nicaragua and negotiate a settlement that 
became ratified as the Autonomy Law guaranteeing the 
ethnic groups of the Coast independent jurisdiction over 
regional issues. 
The leaders of the ive Central American countries, 
alarmed at the growing instability in the region created 
by Washington's proxy war on Nicaragua, closed their 
usually divisive ranks to support a peace plan proposed 
by Oscar Arias of Costa Rica. Esquipulas II, signed on 
August 7, 1987, established a ramework for the pacii­
cation of the region. It called for a process of national 
reconciliation within each country to include dialogue 
with internal opposition groups, amnesty for political 
prisoners, democratization, ree elections, an end to 
military aid and to the use of national territory by one 
government to support irregular or insurrectional forces 
seeking to destabilize a neighbouring country, a call for 
ceaseires with these forces, and the creation, in coopera­
tion with the United Nations (UN) and the Organization 
of American States (OAS), of an international commis­
sion of support and veriication. 
It would be these accords and a subsequent summit 
held in Costa del Sol, El Salvador, on February 14, 1989, 
that set the diplomatic stage or the 1990 Nicaraguan 
elections. Nicaragua offered to advance its election date 
from November to February, reform its electoral and 
media laws in consultation with the opposition and 
invite the OAS and the UN to observe the elections in 
return for the Central American Presidents' approval of 
a joint plan to demobilize the Contras. Responding to 
the Esquipulas II accords, Nicaragua created a National 
Conciliation Commission in the autumn of 1987 that 
included Archbishop Obando y Bravo, an outspoken 
critic of the Sandinista regime, initiated dialogue with 
the Group of 14 (a coalition of parliamentary and extra­
parliamentary opposition parties that would later re­
orm as the UNO), lifted the State of Emergency that 
had been in effect in varying degrees since 1982, and 
reopened the American-funded opposition paper La
Prensa.5 
By the spring of 1988, Nicaragua had begun direct 
peace talks with the Contras and declared a month-to­
month unilateral ceaseire which remained in effect until 
November 1, 1989. Following the Costa de! Sol accords 
of February 1989, 1,984 former members of Somoza's 
National Guard were released and the OAS accepted 
Nicaragua's invitation to observe the electoral process. 
The United States' reaction to Nicaragua's compli­
ance with the spirit and the law of the peace process in 
Central America was to approve a further $49 million in 
"humanitarian" aid to the Contras in April 1989. While 
the provisions of the package prohibited funds for use in 
military offensives, they could be diverted to the 
"voluntary" demobilization and repatriation of the 
Contras, if requested by the ive Central American 
presidents. Thus by enacting this legislation, U.S. 
President Bush had succeeded in ensuring that the 
diplomatic stage of the 1990 elections included the 
presence of a disruptive actor. Since the expiry date of 
the aid package, . February 25, 1990, coincided with 
voting day in Nicaragua, it meant that the Contras, an 
irregular force of 15,000 to 20,000 men, would not only 
remain in place as a trump card to be used at an 
opportune moment but would also remain a decisive 
issue in the electoral campaign. 
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became evident as Nicaragua succeeded in linking the 
demobilization of the Contras as a necessary condition 
to the holding of "free and fair" elections. For while the 
U.S. was upping the ante through its continued unding 
of the Contras, the FSLN was negotiating a series of 
concessions with the opposition parties that would lay 
the ground rules for the 1990 elections and achieve an 
unprecedented degree of national consensus. In April 
1989, after two months of bilateral meetings between 
the FSLN and the opposition, a new media law forbid­
ding censorship and guaranteeing freedom of informa­
tion, and a number of amendments to the electoral law 
(including a controversial rule that permitted foreign 
campaign contributions provided that 50 per cent of all 
donations were given to the multi-party Supreme Elec­
toral Council (CSE) to help finance the technical costs of 
the election) were passed by the National Assembly. On 
August 3, 1989, Daniel Ortega and representatives of the 
18 legally recognized parties running in the election met 
to discuss further reforms demanded by the opposition, 
particularly by the now formally organized UNO coali­
tion. When they emerged, after 24 hours of tense 
negotiations, an agreement had been reached that 
appeared to preclude the possibility of opposition par­
ties withdrawing from the elections (as they had done in 
the 1984 elections) on the pretence that the process had 
lacked dialogue and democratic conditions. The terms of 
this historic National Dialogue included amnesty for all 
remaining political prisoners, the discontinuation of 
military conscription for the duration of the electoral 
process, expanded access to state television for the 
purposes of political advertising, and the transfer of au­
thority over media violations from the Ministry of the 
Interior (MINT) to the CSE. The agreement also issued 
a call on behalf of all parties for the immediate demobi­
lization of the Contras and an appeal against covert 
foreign intervention in the electoral process. 
With these agreements in hand, Ortega was able to 
go to the regional summit, held in Tela, Honduras on 
August 7, 1989, with a formal demand for the Contras' 
demobilization endorsed by all political sectors in Nica­
ragua. In response, the five Central American presidents 
agreed at the Tela summit to establish December 5, 1989 
as the ixed date for the dismantling of the Contras' 
Honduras bases and called upon the OAS and the UN 
to install the International Commission of Support and 
Verification (CIAV) as a monitoring mechanism. The 
signing of the National Dialogue and the Tela Accord 
within days of each other represented an important 
strategic victory for the FSLN. Ortega was able to strip 
the Contras of any remaining residue of legitimacy as a 
national resistance force and to offer the Nicaraguan 
people evidence that peace was within grasp and that 
democratic elections would proceed as planned. The 
immediate reaction of the Contra leadership, which 
announced that it was not a signatory to the agreement 
and would refuse to "voluntarily" demobilize, did not 
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undermine the diplomatic signiicance of an accord that 
had de facto numbered the Contras' days as an armed 
orce. But by October 1989, more than 2000 heavily 
armed and freshly uniormed Contras had infiltrated 
Nicaragua to initiate a series of military offensive 
actions on a scale not witnessed since the declaration of 
unilateral ceasefire by the FSLN over a year and a half 
previously. The Contras' refusal to demobilize had the 
serious implication of becoming a threat to regional sta­
bility and to the democratic process of the election itself. 
The Bush Administration, while maintaining that 
the Contras must remain in Honduras until after 
February 25 as a guarantee of "ree and fair" elections, 
feigned concern at the sudden escalation of Contra 
violence inside Nicaraguan territory, intimating that 
the Contras were acting independently of oicial Ameri­
can policy. The effect of this dramatic increase in Contra 
activity, however, clearly worked in avour of the 
United States' interests. The ambushes, raids and 
murders of civilians, timed to coincide with the voter 
registration process in October, as well as the Contras' 
active proselytizing on behalf of the UNO, created a 
tense and uncertain atmosphere in Nicaragua. With the 
lifting of the ceasefire by Daniel Ortega on November 1, 
1989, in response to the Contra ambush and murder of 
18 unarmed reserve militia on their way to register to 
vote, the promise of peace that had seemed within reach 
receded even further before the spectre of a prolonged 
war. In the United States, the lifting of the ceasefire was 
construed as a deliberate attempt by the Sandinistas to 
undermine the electoral process and cancel the elections. 
A New York Times editorial, "Mr. Ortega's War," which 
appeared November 3, 1989, announced that Ortega 
"could have tried to mobilize diplomatic pressure to 
overcome Washington's foot-dragging on demobilizing 
the Contras, and U.S. indifference to rebel iniltration 
into Nicaragua. Instead, he has declared war and raised 
serious doubts about whether he's ready to risk free and 
air elections. It is not a waning insurgency that appears 
to be Mr. Ortega's real target, but a swelling National 
Opposition Union." 
The alse symmetry of equating national liberation 
struggles with the rise of communist totalitarianism had 
been evoked in a diferent guise. The lifting of the 
ceaseire in Nicaragua was an opportunity to blur the 
distinction between self-defense of sovereign territory 
and unwarranted aggression. 
Ten years of living dangerously has brought civil war, an exodus 
of one fifth of our countrymen, an annual inlation rate of 
30,000 per cent and, or the irst time in our country's history, 
mass hunger. Our industry and agriculture are paralysed. We 
have gone rom being the bread basket of Central America o 
being a basket case. 
-Violeta Chamorro, Washigton Post, November 5, 1989. 
While the signing of the Tela Accord and the National 
Dialogue was an important, if temporal, victory or the 
FSLN over American military and political interven­
tion, their battle against the more insidious effects of 
economic destabilization had not been able to produce 
as visible results. The Contra war had taken a heavy toll 
on Nicaragua's primarily agro-export based economy. 
With 50 per cent of the GNP directed towards military 
self-deense and the Contras targetting of health, educa­
tional, and agricultural cooperatives destroying much of 
the infrastructure created in the first years of the 
revolution, the social backbone of the Sandinista proj­
ect, though not broken by the war, had been severely 
crippled. 
The private sector turned against the revolutionary 
government when it became apparent that, even though 
land reform and state acquisitions had been paced to 
accommodate private interests, the freedom to function 
economically did not go hand in hand with the acquisi­
tion of political power. Attempts to work in harmony 
with private business met with sabotage and capital 
flight, production slowdown and obstruction. In the 
political sphere, the private sector formed a powerful 
lobby group, COSEP (The Higher Council of Private 
Enterprise), openly aligning itself with the Contra 
leadership and subsequently orming the right-wing 
action of the UNO alliance. The United States' com­
mercial boycott and international loans blockade added 
further strains to an economy suffering from the intran­
sigence of private business and $12 billion in war 
damages.6 
· Unrealistic economic strategies implemented by the
Sandinistas in the earlier years of the revolution also 
served to exacerbate a mounting economic crisis. Rigid 
wage and price controls, production incentives and over­
generous credit rates, when combined with an artifi­
cially low currency, fuelled speculation, spurred the 
growth of an underground economy and created a black 
market. 
By 1988, with Hurricane Joan adding a final blow 
to an already devastated economy, inflation hit a world 
record of 36,000 per cent. In the state sector, real wages 
ell below subsistence levels. Factories, lacking workers, 
parts and incentives, produced at low levels. Poor 
agricultural yields and plummeting world cofee prices 
decreased food supplies and increased trade imbalances. 
Speculation was rampant. Unemployment soared. 
To address the severity of the economic crisis, the 
Sandinista government imposed an IMF-model auster­
ity plan in January 1989, which called or slashing state 
employment, cutting social services and reducing pref­
erential credit and exchange rates. These measures, 
when combined with the steps taken since 1987 to lessen 
wage and price control and liberalize export relations, 
had a tremendous impact on both workers and peasants. 
But even though inlation had been reduced to 1000 per 
cent, the price of basic oodstuffs soared beyond the 
reach of many people. 
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i. 8 !_ - - �-. ( " �� _,_·.� �· eeking international aid to soften the���,: of��:e austerity measures, the Nicaraguan government met in 
May 1989 with eight European countries in Stockholm, 
Sweden. An IMF report had found their efforts to rectify 
the economic situation positive, but noted the necessity 
of an immediate inusion of $250 million to stimulate 
production and offset the hardships exacted upon the 
poorer sectors. The Sandinistas were able to obtain a 
commitment rom the eight countries to meet the IMF 
recommendation. After sustained pressure rom the 
United States, however, only two countries, Sweden and 
Spain, came through with their portion ($30 million) of 
the promised aid.7 
Thus, in their efforts to break a IO-year boycott in 
the international loan market, the FSLN's last bargain­
ing tool became the 1990 elections. Their electoral slogan 
"todo seramejor" (everything will be better) relected the 
hope that with the UN and OAS legitimization of the 
elections as "free and air," Europe would not bend so 
easily to American pressure. 
The UNION NACIONAL OPOSITORA (UNO), aware of the fact 
that our country suffers the most delicate crisis of its history, 
basically as a consequence of the dictatorial and totalitarian 
system and the administrative disaster of the Sandinista regime, 
considers that its immediate task consists of dynamic and 
sustained action capable of rescuing the Nicaraguan people from 
the social and economic prostration in which they are immersed. 
-Preamble for the UNO election platorm, August 24, 1989. 
From here to the year 2000, a social structure will have been 
created that is illuminated by the final demolition of the ruins 
we have inherited and by the birth of an economy overflowing 
with health and development. In the next years we will be able 
to do everything that was not possible to do because of the 
war ... The political platorm of the FSLN is none other than the 
ratiication of our historical platorm in new conditions ... Never 
have our dreams been more real. And with our electoral victory 
we will ratify the irreversible destiny of our sovereignty, our 
liberty and our independence. 
-Tomas Borge, FSLN Party Convention speech, Sept. 24, 1989.8 
In terms of conventional political wisdom, the objective 
consequences created by ten years of low intensity 
warfare and economic destabilization would appear to 
have left the FSLN as an incumbent government at a 
significant disadvantage in an electoral contest. The 
1990 elections, however, were not framed by this as­
sumption by either the United States or the UNO, both 
claiming that an opposition in Nicaragua had little 
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gchance of winning against the stacked deck of an i
"undemocratic" revolutionary regime. In September i
1989, as the UNO o11:ht, among themselves over f 
presidential nominations and the FSLN mounted fes- 'i tive and well-orchestrated party conventions, the claim � 
that the UNO had no chance of winning over the FSLN f , appeared to have a strong justiication in reality, � 
although not for the reasons orwarded by either the f
U.S. or the opposition. The initial image of the UNO in . �the beginning stages of the campaign as an ineffectual ' mishmash of conlicting interests and opposing ideolo- £ 
gies never really changed throughout the electoral ��· process. The selection of the American-backed candi-
date, Violeta Chamorro, the politically inexperienced 
widow of assassinated La Prensa editor Pedro Cham­
orro, over COSEP's choice of Enrique Bolanos, a 
politically astute and economically powerful cotton 
grower, was the first signal that the UNO would be 
raught by internal divisions and incoherent strategies.9 
Revelations in November of links to the Contras, 
inighting and corruption further discredited the coali­
tion. On November 1, 1989, a communique issued by 
Enrique Bermudez, as leader of the Contras, announced 
his refusal to demobilize his troops in order to give 
"unconditional support and help to the candidates of the 
UN0."10 On November 7, Barricada published a letter 
written to Enrique Bermudez rom UNO campaign 
organizer Alfredo Cesar stating that the election cam­
paign of the UNO required the presence of an armed 
force.11 Cesar's subsequent expulsion from the UNO 
Political Council and his appointment by Violeta Cham­
orro as her personal adviser only served to increase 
internal tensions and further suspicions that the UNO 
and the Contras were working hand in hand. Meanwhile, 
Virgilio Godoy, the Vice-Presidential candidate of the 
UNO, was accused by members of his own Independent 
Liberal Party (PLI) of embezzling funds and was 
stripped of his parliamentary immunity by the National 
Assembly in December. By January 1990, when Anto­
nio Layaco, the campaign manager of the UNO, and 
Virgilio Godoy were physically istighting on stage 
during a political rally, divisions within the UNO had 
become a highly public and embarrassing affair. 
In spite of $9 million in election aid to the UNO 
(approved by the U.S. Congress on October 17, 1989) to 
make up in hard cash what the UNO coalition lacked in 
organization and popular support, the UNO campaign 
remained weak and lifeless. Fears that the inlux of the 
American aid package to create a "level playing field" 
would result in an upsurge of slick campaign strategies 
and burgeoning grass-roots organizations with paid 
"volunteers" went unounded. The UNO's attempts to 
avoid paying 50 per cent of political campaign contribu­
tions to the Supreme Electoral Council by channelling 
the money into "non-partisan" democratic educational 
groups such as Via Civica and the hastily constructed 
Institute for Electoral Promotion and Training (IPCE) 
only served to encourage graft and increase bickering 
among recipients. The number of organizations receiv­
ing funds and the role of the National Endowment or 
Democracy (NED) as the American administrator seek­
ing loopholes and accountability impeded the level of co­
ordinated planning. 12 By February 1990, as Violeta 
Chamorro continued to stumble over ghostwritten 
speeches she hesitantly read during poorly attended 
rallies and the polls indicated that the UNO sufered a 
negative image as a party too closely aligned with U.S. 
interests, it seemed as if the strategy of political 
intervention by the Americans had failed. 
Although the UNO failed to mount an efective and 
visible campaign, it did succeed in undermining the 
model of political pluralism the Sandinistas had envi­
sioned developing through the electoral process. In 
theory, the Nicaraguan electoral process was designed to 
ofer all parties an equal opportunity to present their 
points of view during the campaign and, with their 
election to the National Assembly, create a forum or 
resolving ideological differences and interest conlicts 
through discussion and negotiation. In practice, how­
ever, the UNO's participation shifted the ocus of the 
electoral contest away from a multi-party race based on 
national issues and towards a polarized battle ought 
between sovereignty and imperialism. Coherent and 
considered debate that focused on concrete economic 
and social issues deteriorated into a media war where 
promises of peace and economic prosperity were articu­
lated in an accusatory atmosphere that pitted patriot­
ism against American salvation. As the U.S.-backed 
opposition, the UNO promised the Nicaraguan people 
that they had the ear of the Bush Administration when 
it came to the issues of lifting the economic blockade and 
ending the Contra war. Replaying the American para­
digm of East totalitarianism versus West reedom, the 
UNO and La Prensa unleashed an inlammatory stream 
of rhetoric in which the Sandinistas, as blood-thirsty 
communists/dictators, had imposed a reign of terror and 
deprivation, bringing war and economic chaos to a 
country where the leaders lived in castles and the poor 
died of starvation. 
Daniel Ortega responded by denouncing the UNO 
at FSLN rallies as a scram bled mess of nothing ( NO no 
es niguno), a haven for ex-Somocistas and ex-Contras 
and a coalition that had sold its soul to imperialism. 
Meanwhile, the "centre" of the political spectrum, rep­
resented by Eric Ramirez's Social Christian Party 
(PSC), was squeezed rom view (failing to obtain any 
seats in the National Assembly in the February 25 vote) 
while other smaller parties faded into obscurity during 
the initial stages of the electoral campaign. 
The ascinating thing is that everybody knows, or should know 
by now, what a rat the commandante [Daniel Ortega] is. Yet we 
count on him to keep his pledged word. We react with visible 
hurt when he shows us unworthy of his trust. It's like the inal 
scene of the Hollywood classic, "Key Largo." Edward G. 
Robinson, palming the pistol he proesses not to have, whines for 
his adversary, Humphrey Bogari, to come out and show himself. 
Bogey proves himself o s�ri or that old canard. You wonder 
why men charged with running the destinies of nations some­
times lack the inelligence and insight of a movie actor. 
-William Marchson, Editorial, Washington Times, Nov. 3, 1989.
On December 10, 1989, the simmering tensions created 
by a polarized electoral landscape erupted into overt 
violence at an UNO rally in Masatepe (30 miles south of 
Managua), leaving a Sandinista supporter dead, 15 
wounded and the campaign headquarters of the FSLN 
destroyed. Although the OAS issued a report following 
the incident that stated, "It is impossible to determine 
.who is responsible or the initiation of violence," UNO 
used Masatepe to threaten withdrawal from the elec­
tions while the American press echoed its early Novem­
ber accusations that the FSLN was conspiring to create 
an excuse for the cancellation of the elections. Added to 
the Contra card that Washington had played out in the 
autumn was the added worry that the UNO and the U.S. 
were planning a series of provocations in order to 
delegitimize the Nicaraguan elections and further exac­
erbate an atmosphere of polarization and fear. 
While millions of East Germans swept through West Berlin like 
Hurricane Hugo last weekend, apparatchiks all over Eastern 
Europe began to get the idea that the crumbling of communism 
had inally begun. Yet in Central America, the revanchists are 
holding on. El Salvador's Marxist FLMN hoisted its red and 
black banderole last Saturday night, launching a major assault 
on the capital city ... "Our mission is to win or die," a young 
rebel dramatically told reporters. "This is our last battle." We 
hope it will be, if the Salvadorans and the Bush Administration 
inally get serious about bringing peace to Central America. At 
least they seem to have recognized the source of the problem, 
which isn't Salvadoran political or economic conditions but the 
communist govements in Managua and Havana. 
-"Communism's Last Battle," Editorial, Washington Times,
November 17, 1989. 
The unfolding of the electoral process in the autumn of 
1989 was not only marked by Contra iniltration, the 
lifting of the ceasefire, polarization and suspected 
American covert action, but also demarcated by the 
sudden escalation of tensions in the region. With the 
military ofensive launched by the FLMN (Farabundi 
Marti National Liberation Front) on November 11 and 
the Christmas invasion of Panama by the Americans, 
what in August 1989 had looked like a future horizon of 
negotiated settlements threatened, by December 1989, 
to engulf all of Central America in a regional war. In the 
wake of the FLMN offensive, troop movements in 
Honduras and Guatemala were rumoured. The reports 
of the genocidal bombing of civilian neighbourhoods in 
El Salvador evoked memories in Nicaragua of the 1979 
insurrection which blurred with the present escalation of 
Contra activity inside Nicaragua. 
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lffocts by the FSLN th,oughoot Novembec to hold a series of talks with the Contras under the auspices of the UN and the OAS failed to advance an agreement on their demobilization. The alleged discovery of a crashed Nicaraguan plane carrying weapons inside EI Sal�adoran territory was used by Alfredo Christiani, the President of EI Salvador, to sever diplomatic relations with the Nicaraguan government. The San Isidro de Coronado regional summit, held in Costa Rica on De­cember 12, 1989, temporarily defused hostilities. The ive Central American presidents signed an agreement reairming the legitimate sovereignty of each govern­ment and calling upon the United States to divert unding for Contra maintenance to the CIA V for pur­poses of their demobilization. This respite from two months of escalating tensions, however, proved fleeting. The invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989 and the invasion of the Nicaraguan ambassador's residence by U.S. troops a week later led Daniel Ortega to declare that in ten years of revolution U.S./Nicaragua relations had never been as strained. Although Bush's nonchalant admission of a "screw-up" over the Panama incident once again defused overt hostilities, the people of Nicaragua had lived through two months of roller­coaster tensions, with American strong-arm tactics still looming large over Central America. By mid-January 1990, a surface calm had de­scended upon Managua, the maximum alert from the Panama invasion was lifted and the army tanks in the city streets were replaced by an urban landscape of political slogans and billboard election advertising. The ear generated by the Masatepe incident and American press coverage that the UNO would withdraw from the electoral races diminished. By the time 3000 interna­tional observers and 1500 international journalists descended upon Nicaragua in the last two weeks of February to witness the most carefully scrutinized electoral process in the history of the world, the roller­coaster tensions of the autumn had been displaced by a festive campaign atmosphere. FSLN T-shirts, hats, and slogans of "Daniel es mi gallo" (Daniel is my rooster) 13 inundated Managua, while UNO propaganda, suddenly appearing three weeks beore the election, was scarce and unimaginative. Salsa tunes written especially or the FSLN election campaign flooded the state airwaves, while opposition stations continued to harangue listen­ers with a litany of grievances about Sandinista intimi­dation of UNO supporters and abuse of the state infrastructure. On television, the UNO commercials, with images of misery and starving children searching through garbage cans, sought to emphasize the eco­nomic crisis, while the FSLN rock-video upbeat propa­ganda sought to evoke a future of peace and happiness. In the last week of the campaign, each side claimed potential victory. The UNO complained that the FSLN could only win through election day fraud; the FSLN explained that an extensive campaign of door-to-door visits and public rallies across the nation had conirmed 
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that they were and would be the party of the people. When, on February 18, the UNO held its inal rally at the Plaza of the revolution, 40,000 people gathered to hear Violeta Chamorro dressed in virgin white promise economic salvation. The UNO rally, however, proved no match or the FSLN spectacle mounted in the Plaza Carlos Fonseca on February 25 complete with 500,000 cheering fans, girls dancing to Batman themes, dazzling ireworks and a Jimmy Cliff concert. A number of polling companies had conducted surveys throughout the electoral process showing Daniel Ortega leading Violeta Chamorro. Their inal opinion surveys, released in February, showed Ortega swinging even further ahead. The only polls contradicting this trend were clearly identified opposition surveys whose links to La
Prensa and refusal to release methodology made them suspect in the eyes of most political analysts.14 By the time the campaign oficially closed, it seemed as if the FSLN could not help but sweep the election day vote, the only doubt remaining was the American acceptance of their victory. On voting day itself, rumours that exit polls showing the UNO leading would be released beore the oficial count appeared to be one last desperate attempt to discredit the FSLN win and to provoke election day violence. On February 25, 1990, as people across Nicaragua waited patiently in line to cast their ballots, hundreds of writers, including myself, prepared to write analyses of the Sandinista triumph, citing the victory of grassroots organization and popular democ­racy over a badly managed American intervention. Forgotten in the frantic days that preceded February 25, as the world descended upon this small, war-torn, -heat-drenched country to witness history's most care­fully scrutinized elections, were the events of the au­tumn: the escalation of Contra activity, the invasion ofPanama, the grinding effects of an economic crisis. Theiesta atmosphere had temporarily masked the underly­ing tensions of a ten-year struggle against Americanaggression and camouflaged the exhaustion of a peoplewhose project for self-determination had meant con­fronting the wrath of the most powerful nation in thehemisphere.
For the Frente Sandinista [FSLN] democracy is not measured 
only in the political terrain and is not reduced to the participa­
tion of the people in elections. Demcracy ... means participa­
tion of the people in political, economic, social and cultural 
affairs. Democracy is initiated in the economic order, when 
social inequities begin to weaken, when workers and peasants 
begin to improve their standard of living. 
-FSLN, 190. 
I believe that it is important that we begin to analyse the anti­
imperialist revolutionary model and ask ourselves why it has 
ended in economic ailure which is inally the essential asect of 
each revolution. For one des not make a revolution in order to 
fortify war, but in order to see economic results, and it is thee 
results that we have not seen. 
-Victor Tirado, National Direction, 10.15 
On March 1, 1990, however, as I prepare to close this 
chapter in the story of the Nicaraguan elections, it seems 
as if the past cannot not be so easily forgiven, nor the 
future of reconciliation so easily attained. Thus, while 
the people of Nicaragua may have voted in a "ree and 
air" election to end a conrontation with the United 
States of America, this electoral exercise of democracy 
did not end a conrontation with inheritances of a ten­
year war and with the disparities created by the 
"economic totalitarianism" of a global economy that 
divides the hemisphere into the centre and the periph­
ery, into First and Third worlds, into developed and 
underdeveloped nations. 
For ten years Nicaragua has been at the crossroad 
of an anti-imperialist struggle, of a North/South con­
lict, of an East/West rhetoric. As an epicentre of the 
periphery's struggle against a vicious cycle of neocolo­
nialism and underdevelopment, the results of the 1990 
Nicaraguan elections were elt as seismological shocks 
across the hemisphere. The victory of the UNO, how­
ever, was not an earthquake powerful enough to topple 
ten years of revolutionary infrastructure. The story of 
the 1990 Nicaraguan elections that began on July 19, 
1979, when the FSLN promised the people of Nicaragua 
a revolutionary model of political pluralism, social 
justice and a mixed economy, did not end on February 
25 with the veriication of "ree and fair" elections by 
3000 international observers and 1500 journalists. In 
1990, the FSLN as a political party was defeated at the 
polls, but as long as the world remains divided into the 
strong and the weak, the rich and the poor, the dream 
of self-determination bequeathed by the Sandinista 
revolution will continue to be lived out in the struggle 
at the periphery for economic and social justice. For 
during ten years of revolution, the people of Nicaragua 
did not only live an experience of war and economic 
deprivation, but also the experience of conscious politi­
cization and popular democracy: the realization of a 
national literacy campaign,. mass organization and 
industry unionization, control over national resources, 
an army of and for the people, reedom of expression, 
reedom rom repression, ree education, ree elections. 
The Sandinista vision of economic equality and prosper­
ity may have been obstructed by ten years of American 
aggression, but the ideals of the revolution have passed 
into the collective memory of the people. 
The false symmetry of East/West rhetoric and 
North/South conlict suggests the enormity of the 
struggle that lies beore the Nicaraguan people in their 
search for a model of resistance and revolution in the 
ace of an expansionist American capitalism, in a 
hemisphere where the periphery sinks deeper into a 
vicious circle of external debt and escalating poverty. 
Historical conditions gave birth to the guerilla victory 
of the Sandinistas in 1979. The historical conditions that 
brought them electoral defeat in 1990 do not signify the 
end of a revolution, rather they presage a future where 
the confrontation between imperialism and self-deter­
mination is just beginning. • 
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